We consider a dynamic collective choice problem where a large number of agents are cooperatively choosing between multiple destinations while being influenced by the behavior of the group. For example, in a robotic swarm exploring a new environment, a robot might have to choose between multiple sites to visit, but at the same time it should remain close to some group to achieve coordinated tasks. Finding a social optimum for our problem reduces to solving a set of linear quadratic regulator problems, whose number, however, increases exponentially with the size of the population. Alternatively, we develop via the mean field games methodology a set of decentralized strategies characterized via the fixed points of a suitable operator. In the homogeneous parameter agents case, the procedure reduces to solving a vector fixed point equation of size l equal to the number of destinations, followed by each agent comparing only l regulator costs, independently of the number of agents. When the latter is sufficiently large, the strategies qualify as approximately socially optimal. To compute the approximate social optimum, each agent only needs to know its own state and the statistical distributions of the agents' initial states and problem parameters. A numerical example illustrates the benefits of cooperative strategies compared to noncooperative ones in achieving an adequate splitting of agents among multiple destinations that each require collective attention.
I. INTRODUCTION
Discrete choice models were developed in economics to understand human choice behavior. A concern of these models is predicting the decision of an individual in the face of a set of alternatives, for example, anticipating a traveler's choice between different modes of transportation [1] . These choices depend on some measurable personal characteristics, such as the traveler's financial situation, on some attributes of the alternatives, such as their prices, and on some unobservable attributes, e.g., the traveler's taste. The first static discrete choice model was proposed by McFadden in [2] .
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TAC.2018.2797199 ers' choices, for example entry or withdrawal from the labor market in cooperative families [3] , i.e., families where the members make cooperatively their choices to minimize a global cost. A static discrete choice model with social interactions was studied by Brock and Durlauf in [4] , where the authors develop both a noncooperative and a cooperative games involving a large number of players. Each player makes a choice between two alternatives while being affected by the average of its peers' decisions. Inspired by the statistical mechanics approach, Brock and Durlauf propose a methodology to solve the game that is similar to the recently developed Mean Field Games (MFGs) approach, which we discuss further down.
The main goal of this paper is to study dynamic cooperative collective choice problems. These are concerned with situations where a large number of players/agents make socially influenced choices among a finite set of alternatives. Concretely, we consider a group of agents initially spread out in an Euclidean space. These agents should move within a finite time horizon from their initial conditions towards one of multiple destination points, while trying to remain close to some function of their average trajectory. In navigation applications for example, a planner might want to deploy a swarm of robots to explore an unknown terrain and choose between multiple potential sites of interest to visit. The robots can possibly split, but each subgroup should remain sufficiently large to carry out collective tasks of interest [5] - [9] .
The main contributions of this note, both practical and technical, can be described as follows: 1) We study a dynamic cooperative collective choice model with a large number of agents making choices among a finite set of alternatives under a social pressure. 2) We show in Section III that the computation of an exact social optimum of the problem becomes quickly intractable as the number of the players increases sufficiently. Moreover, implementation of the optimal policies requires a significant amount of communication. Instead, we develop via the MFG methodology a set of strategies that converge to a social optimum as the size of the population increases to infinity. These strategies are tractable, decentralized once the initial spatial distribution of the agents is estimated, simpler to compute than the exact solution, and overall require significantly less communication. 3) On the technical level, the paper borrows from [10] the idea of turning a social optimization problem into a noncooperative game via a person to person optimization approach with appropriately redefined agent costs. However, because our mathematical model involves a set of nonsmooth and nonconvex final costs to capture the discrete choice phenomenon, a drastically different proof machinery is required here to establish asymptotic social optimality of the policies when the number of agents becomes arbitrarily large. The proofs are nevertheless strongly dependent on the particular form of the final costs (minimum of quadratic functions), and as a result, do not carry naturally to the setting of more general nonconvex final costs. 4) We compare via a numerical example the cooperative and noncooperative [11] behaviors for the dynamic collective choice problem. The results show that the cooperative behavior has the advantage of much more evenly allocating the agents to the alternative choices, a crucial feature when considering applications such as the robotic collective deployment example.
The agents involved in our model are weakly coupled, i.e., while the individual choices are considerably influenced by an aggregate of the agents' choices, for a sufficiently large population, an isolated individual's choice has a negligible influence on the others' choices. Hence, we follow in this paper the MFG methodology, which is concerned with dynamic games involving a large number of weakly coupled agents. It was originally developed in a series of papers to study dynamic noncooperative games [12] - [17] . The cooperative linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) MFG formulation was developed later in [10] , where the authors investigate the structure of the LQG costs to develop for a continuum of agents a set of decentralized person-by-person optimal strategies (a weaker solution concept than the social optimum, although the two concepts coincide under some conditions [18] , [19] ). Moreover, they show that these strategies, when applied by a finite population, converge to an exact social optimum as the number of players increases to infinity. Although the methodology used here follows in part the person-by-person optimization setting of [10] , the nonsmoothness and nonconvexity of the final costs in our formulation (see (3) below) require different proofs for the convergence of the mean field based decentralized strategies to the social optimum, see Lemmas 5, 9, Theorem 6, and Remark 3. These characteristics of the final costs are fundamental to capture the additional complexity of the discrete choice phenomenon compared to the LQG problem. In particular, and unlike [10] , for our model we obtain decentralized strategies that are discontinuous with respect to the agents' initial conditions, a consequence of having to choose among a finite set of alternatives.
In [11] , we studied noncooperative behaviors for our collective choice problem and developed via the MFG methodology approximate Nash strategy profiles that converge to exact Nash equilibria as the number of players increases to infinity. Since the person-by-person solutions are Nash-like solutions, we rely in this note on some results from [11] to establish the existence of such solutions and compute them.
The cooperative dynamic discrete choice model is formulated in Section II. Section III presents a naive solution to finding an exact social optimum, which requires solving l N linear quadratic regulator (LQR) problems, each of dimension Nn, where l is the number of choices, N the number of players, and n the dimension of the individual state spaces. Alternatively, we develop in Section IV via the MFG approach and within the person-byperson optimization setting a set of decentralized strategies that are later shown to be asymptotically socially optimal. The strategies are obtained by determining the fixed points of a certain operator. In the homogeneous parameter case, as in [11] , this reduces to solving a fixed point vector equation of dimension l independent of N , thereby achieving a significant gain in computational efficiency. In Section V, we discuss simulation results illustrating the benefits of the methodology for spreading agents between multiple destinations, while Section VI presents our conclusions.
II. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
We consider a cooperative collective choice model involving N players with linear dynamicṡ
where A i ∈ R n ×n , B i ∈ R n ×m , x i ∈ R n are the states of agent i, u i ∈ U = L 2 ([0, T ], R m ) its control input and x 0 i its initial state. The players cooperate to minimize a common social cost
where
where q, r i > 0, Z ∈ R n ×n , p j ∈ R n , j = 1, . . . , l, are the destination points, and the M ij are large positive numbers. The individual cost functions penalize along the path the effort and the deviation from a linear function of the mean state x (N ) . Moreover, each agent must be close at time T to one of the destination points, otherwise it is strongly penalized by the final cost. Hence, the overall individual cost is tailored for the objective of crystallizing a choice among a finite set of alternative destinations, while trying to remain all along close to some function of the mean state, typically the mean population trajectory itself. The agents are cost-coupled via the average x (N ) . We assume that the coefficient M ij depends on the agent i and the destination point p j to impose initial preferences toward the alternatives (for further details about the initial preferences, we refer the reader to [11, Section VI] ). When considering the limiting population (N → ∞), it is convenient to represent the limiting sequence of (
..,N by the random vector (x 0 , θ) on some probability space (Ω, F, P ). We assume that θ is in a compact set Θ. Let us denote the empirical measure of the sequence
We assume that P N 0θ has a weak limit P 0θ (the distribution of (x 0 , θ)). For further discussions about this assumption, one can refer to [10] . We assume that x 0 and θ are independent, that is, P 0θ = P 0 × P θ , where P 0 and P θ are respectively the marginal distributions of x 0 and θ.
To motivate the need for decentralized strategies, we start in the following section by solving for a social optimum [the optimal control law (u * 1 , . . . , u * N ) of (2)], and discuss the complexity of a naive direct approach to computing this exact solution. In the following, we denote x Qx by x 2 Q , for any x ∈ R k and Q ∈ R k ×k .
III. CENTRALIZED SOCIAL OPTIMUM
In this section, we assume that each player can observe the states and the parameters of the other players. We define x = (x 1 , . . . , x N ) the state of the population and u = (u 1 , . . . , u N ) its strategy profile. The population's dynamics is theṅ
The individual costs can be written
where Δ = {p 1 , . . . , p l } is the set of destination points and
Using the equality a + min(b, c) = min(a + b, a + c), one can prove by induction that the social cost (2) can be written J soc u,
The set Δ N represents the set of potential deployment configurations. For example, d = (p 1 , p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p 2 ) ∈ Δ N means that players 1 and 2 are at time T near p 1 , whereas the other players are closer to p 2 . Noting
, one can optimize the l N costs J d and choose the least costly combination of destination points d * ∈ Δ N , which corresponds to the minimum of the optima of J d . The difficulty, however, is that there are exponentially many ways for the N players to split between the l destination points.
The costs J d , for each d ∈ Δ N , can be written
with ⊗ denoting the Kronecker product, 1 = [1, . . . , 1] , diag(.) denoting a block diagonal matrix. For each possible combination of destinations d ∈ Δ N , the LQR problem defined by (6) and (4) has a unique optimal control law [20] 
with the corresponding optimal cost
where Γ d , β d , and δ d are, respectively, matrix-, vector-, and realvalued functions satisfying the following backward propagating differential equations:
We summarize the above analysis in the following theorem. Theorem 1: The social planner problem (2) has an optimal control law u d * * defined in (8) 
A configuration d ∈ Δ N costs the population J d * . Theorem 1 asserts that the optimal solution of (2) corresponds to the optimal deployment configuration. Thus, to compute an optimal solution of (2), the agents can naively compute the l N optimal LQR costs J d * , find the least costly one, and the corresponding control law (8) is an optimal control law of (2). Three major difficulties occur, however, when the size of the population is large: 1) the number of potential configurations increases exponentially with the size of the population; 2) an optimal control law involves differential (10a)-(10c) whose dimensions increases with the order N 2 ; 3) to compute its strategy u i according to (8) To address these issues, we develop in the following sections a set of decentralized strategies proved to be asymptotically optimal. Their computation involves solving a fixed point equation (of dimension n in the homogeneous case) yielding the mean agent state trajectory, followed by the computation of the minimum of l optimal LQR costs (16) each of state dimension equal to n (irrespective of population size). These strategies are decentralized in the sense that an agent i's strategy depends only on its state x i and on the distributions P 0 and P θ of the initial conditions and parameters, respectively.
In summary, while the centralized solution requires the computation of l N LQR costs, each of state dimension equal to nN , and observation by individuals of all agent states and parameters, our approximate decentralized solution involves 1) solving a fixed point problem, and 2) computing lN optimal costs for LQR problems with state dimension n.
As discussed in Section II, to capture the discrete choice component of the problem, the final cost forces the agents to be at time T in the vicinity of one of the destination points. Indeed, the following theorem establishes that for sufficiently large M ij 's, each player reaches an arbitrarily small neighborhood of a destination point. Moreover, it asserts that there is only one set of destination points p * ∈ R N n that the agents can reach exactly under an optimal control law, with p * defined as the final state x r (T ) under the control law u r optimizing
i.e., (6) with zero final cost.
. . , N, are controllable and the agents are applying a control law optimal for (2). Then, i) for any > 0, there exists M 0 > 0 such that for all M ij > M 0 , each agent is at time T inside a ball of radius and centered at one of the destination points. Proof: See [Th. 2, 21] . Omitted for lack of space.
IV. DECENTRALIZED SOCIAL OPTIMUM
A weaker solution concept than the social optimum is the person-by-person optimal solution [19] , [20] . In the following, we denote (u 1 , . . . , u i−1 , u i+1 , . . . , u N ) by u −i .
Definition 1: A strategy profile (u * i , u * −i ) is said to be personby-person optimal with respect to the social cost
A social optimum is necessarily a person-by-person optimal solution. Following the methodology proposed in [10] , we compute in the following section a set of decentralized approximate person-by-person solutions. Moreover, we show under some technical assumptions that these solutions become socially optimal as N → ∞.
A. Person-by-Person Optimality
Assuming that the other players fixed their person-byperson optimal strategies u * −i , an agent i computes its person-by-person optimal strategy u * i by minimizing the cost [10] , one can show that the social cost can be written
The term J 2,i (u * −i ) does not depend on the strategy u i of player i. Therefore, minimizing J soc (u i , u * −i , x * (N ) −i
The person-by-person optimal solutions (u * i , u * −i ) are the Nash equilibria of a noncooperative game involving the N players defined in (1) but associated with the individual costs J 1,i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N defined in (12) . The players are cost-coupled through the average of the population. In the following, we develop via the MFG approach a decentralized approximate Nash strategy profile with respect to (12) , or equivalently a set of decentralized approximately person-by-person optimal strategies with respect to (2) .
B. Mean Field Equation System
According to the MFG approach, each agent assumes a continuum of agents and computes its best response to an assumed given continuous pathx, which represents the mean path of the infinite size population under a Nash strategy profile. Since the players must collectively reproduce this assumed mean path when applying their best responses to it, it can be computed by a fixed point argument. Assuming an infinite population, the costs (12) reduce to the cost of a generic agent with state x, control input u and parameters θ
wherex = Ex is the mean trajectory of the infinite size population. The generic agent's state x satisfies (1) where
, with an initial state x 0 (ω) drawn from P 0 and parameters θ(ω) = (A θ , B θ , r θ , M θ 1 , . . . , M θl )(ω) drawn from P θ . In the following, we omit ω from the notation.
1) The Generic Agent's Best Response tox:
For k = 1, . . . , l, we define Γ θ k , β θ k , and δ θ k to be the unique solutions of the following differential equationṡ
Given the initial condition and the parameters, an agent's best response tox and the corresponding optimal cost areû
wherex t, x 0 , θ is the generic agent's state under the feedback law (15) and for j = 1, . . . , l D θ j (x) = x ∈ R n ∀k = 1, . . . , l,
Proof: See [11, Lemma 1]. The cost function (13) can be written as the minimum of l LQR cost functions, each corresponding to a distinct possible destination point. The optimal control law is then the optimal control law of the least costly LQR problem. The regions D θ j (x), j = 1, . . . , l defined in (17) are such that if an agent is initially in D θ j (x), then the LQR problem corresponding to p j is the least costly, and the agent goes toward p j by applying the optimal control law of the LQR problem corresponding to this destination point.
We
From [11] , for x 0 ∈ D θ j (x), the state trajectory of a generic agent iŝ
2) Existence of a Solution for the Mean Field Fixed Point
Equation System: The mean field equation system consists of (14a)-(14c) plus the infinite size population mean equation
This equation system defines an operator G(.) from the Banach space (C([0, T ], R n ), ∞ ) into itself. The operator G maps the assumed given pathx to the mean trajectory of the continuum of players when they optimally respond tox, described by the right-hand side of (20) . Since it is assumed at the beginning of Section IV-B thatx is the mean trajectory of the infinite size population, an admissible pathx must be a fixed point of G. In the following, we provide conditions under which G has at least one fixed point. We define
Since Θ and [0, T ] are compact and Φ θ j is continuous with respect to time and parameter θ, the constants k 1 , k 2 , and k 3 are well defined.
Assumption 1: We assume that max(k 1 + k 2 , k 3 )T < π/2. Note that Assumption 1 can be satisfied for a sufficiently short time horizon T .
Assumption 2: We assume that L 0, where L is defined in (7) . Assumption 2 is satisfied, for example, when Z = αI n , with α < 0 or α ≥ 2. In the first case (α < 0), the social effect is to drive the agents away from the mean of the population, whereas in the second case (α ≥ 2) the social effect is attraction.
Assumption 3: We assume that P 0 is such that the P 0 − measure of quadric hypersurfaces is zero.
Assumption 4: We assume that E x 0 2 < ∞. [11, Th. 8] , where Assumption 1 is used to construct a bounded set that is mapped by G into itself. For uniform parameters ((A θ , B θ , M θj , r θ ) = (A, B, M, r) ), one can also show by techniques similar to those used in [11, Th. 6] thatx is a fixed point of G if and only ifx is equal to the optimal state trajectory y λ of the LQR problem
with p λ = l j =1 λ j p j and λ = (λ 1 , . . . , λ l ) a fixed point of λ → F (λ) := (P (x 0 ∈ D 1 (y λ )), . . . , P (x 0 ∈ D l (y λ ))). In this case, λ j , for a fixed point λ of F , is the mass of the initial conditions that are in the basin of attraction D j (y λ ), i.e., the mass of agents that go toward p j when they optimally respond to the fixed point y λ . Thus, there exists a one to one map between the fixed points of G and those of the finite dimensional operator F . The latter are the potential probability distributions of the choices between the alternatives. The existence and uniqueness of an optimal solution of (22) is a consequence of Assumption 2.
The strategiesû defined in (15) are decentralized. In fact, to compute its strategyû i =û(t, x 0 i , θ i ), an agent i only needs to know its own state and a fixed point pathx of G [defined by (14a)-(14c) and (20) ]. Thisx depends on the distributions P 0θ (the weak limit of P N 0θ , the empirical joint distribution of the parameters, and initial conditions for a population of size N ) assumed known to all the agents. Unlike the centralized case, the dimensions of the differential equations that define the decentralized optimal strategies (14a)-(14c) are independent of the size of the population. Moreover, an agent needs only to check the costs corresponding to its l choices (13) and pick the least costly one.
C. Asymptotic Social Optimum
In this section, we show that when the agents (in the finite population) apply the strategy profileû defined in (15) for a fixed point pathx, the corresponding per agent social cost (2) converges to the optimal per agent social cost as the size of the population increases to infinity. At the end of this section, we also give an explicit form of the asymptotic per agent optimal social cost.
Assumption 5: We assume that 1
Remark 2: Using the Portmanteau Theorem [22, Sec. 3] , one can show that Assumption 5 implies Assumption 4.
In the following lemma, we show that when applying the decentralized person-by-person control laws, the finite population average path converges to the fixed point pathx that the agents are optimally tracking. In the standard LQG MFG literature, where the generic agent's state trajectory (considered as a family of random variables indexed by the time) is uniformly bounded and equicontinuous with respect to the initial conditions and parameters, the proof of this result relies on Corollary 1.1.5 of [23] . In our case, this trajectory (19) , considered as a function of the time t, the initial condition x 0 , and the parameter θ, is discontinuous. In fact, it has on each basin of attraction D θ j a different structure that depends on the corresponding p j . Hence, the proof requires some additional constructions to handle the discontinuity. Given a fixed point pathx of G, we definê (19) . 
Proof: See Appendix A. We now state the main result of this paper. Remark 3 (Importance of Assumption 2). In static games, a sufficient condition of the person-by-person solution to be a social optimum is the convexity and smoothness of the costs [20, Lemma 2.6.1]. Although not explicitly mentioned by the authors in [10] , this condition (which is automatically satisfied in the LQG setting) guarantees also the convergence of the personby-person solution to the social optimum in case of dynamic LQG MFG problems [10, The. 4.2] . In our case, Assumption 2 is required to handle the nonconvexity of our final costs. For further details, we refer the reader to Remark 4 in the Appendix.
Theorem 7 gives an explicit form of the asymptotic per agent optimal social cost lim x (N ) ). The expression depends only on the distributions P 0 , P θ , and of a fixed point pathx.
Theorem 7: Under Assumptions 2, 3, and 5
Proof: See Appendix A.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we compare numerically the cooperative and noncooperative behaviors of a group of agents choosing between two alternatives under the social effect. We consider a uniform group of 400 players initially drawn from the Gaussian distribution N [ −5 10] , 15I 2 and moving in R 2 according to the dynamics
toward the potential destination points p 1 = (−10, 0) or p 2 = (10, 0). We set r i = 10, M ij = 1200, T = 2, Z = 3.5I 2 and we vary the social effect coefficient q. For this choice of z, cooperative agents will tend to split in their choices of final destinations since highly grouped motions produce a high tracking cost. Note that L = Z Z − Z − Z = 5.25I 2 satisfies Assumption 2. Since we have a binary choice problem, in both the cooperative and the noncooperative cases one can characterize the way the population is split between the alternatives by a number λ ∈ [0, 1], which is the fraction of players going toward p 1 . In [11, Th. 6 and Sec. 5-A], it is shown that this number λ is a fixed point of a well-defined function F and can be computed by dichotomy. Moreover, we describe how to compute the fixed point pathx corresponding to λ. For q = 0 (no social effect), the cooperative and noncooperative cases become essentially indistinguishable. Indeed, Figs. 1 and 2 show that 82% of the players (green squares in Fig. 2 ) go toward p 2 in both cases. As the social effect increases (q increases from 0 to 45), in the noncooperative case, agents acting selfishly all try to beat the mean, but they do so by moving in the same direction, that where the majority lies initially. As a result, the mean "follows them." Ultimately, the minority group reduces from 18% to zero (see Fig. 1 ). In the cooperative case, however, because individual agents anticipate and know that they can influence the dynamics of the mean, they tend instead to split in groups that move in opposite directions, achieving as a result a better control of mean dynamics. Consequently, the size of the majority decreases and the population splits more evenly between the two choices (see Fig. 3 ), thus achieving per agent costs lower than in the noncooperative case, as confirmed by Fig. 1 .
VI. CONCLUSION
We consider in this paper a dynamic cooperative discrete choice model where a large number of players are making a socially influenced choice between multiple alternatives. Finding an exact social optimum can be done by solving a number of LQR problems that grows exponentially with the number of players. Alternatively, we develop via the MFG methodology a set of decentralized strategies that are asymptotically socially optimal, and efficiently computable. Analysis of our simulation results points at the potential of the cooperative formulation in helping to induce a splitting of agents in sufficient numbers toward multiple destinations where collective tasks may be awaiting them. The computation of the decentralized strategies assumes that each agent knows the statistical distributions of the initial states and parameters. For future work, it is of interest to consider situations where the cooperative players learn these statistical distributions while moving toward the destination points, e.g., by sharing and updating their current states and parameters through a random communication graph.
APPENDIX A

A. Proof of Lemma 5
The functions defined by (14a), (14b), and (14c) are continuous with respect to θ, which belongs to a compact set Θ. The random variables θ and x 0 are assumed to be independent. Therefore, under Assumption 4 and by Fubini-Tonelli's theorem [24] , the operator G defined in Section IV-B2 by (14a)-(14c) and (20) has the following form:
In view of (23) and (26), we havex (N ) 
) and x(t, x 0 , θ) were uniformly bounded and equicontinuous with respect to the initial conditions and parameters, then one could show the convergence by [23, Corollary 1.1.5]. Butx(t, x 0 i , θ i ) andx(t, x 0 , θ) are discontinuous. Alternatively, we show that the set of discontinuity points has a measure zero under Assumption 3. We then we show thatx (N ) converges pointwise tox. Finally, We prove the uniform convergence, from which the result follows.
Pointwise convergence: P N 0 θ converges in distribution to P 0 θ . Therefore, there exist on some probability space (Ω, F, P ) a sequence of random variables (X 0 N , ξ θ N ) of distribution P N 0 θ and a random variable (X 0 , ξ θ ) of distribution P 0 θ such that (X 0 N , ξ θ N ) converges with probability one to (X 0 , ξ θ ). Thusx (N ) (t) −x(t) = Ω x t, X 0 N , ξ θ N −x t, X 0 , ξ θ dP . For a fixed t, the discontinuity points ofx (t, x 0 , θ) (considered now as a function of x 0 and θ) are included in the set D = {(x 0 , θ) ∈ R n × Θ | x 0 ∈ ∂D θ j (x)}. Under Assumption 3 and the independence of x 0 and θ, one can prove that P 0 × P θ (D) = 0. Hence,x t, X 0 N , ξ θ N converges with probability one tox t, X 0 , ξ θ . The compactness of [0, T ] and Θ, and the continuity of Π θ j imply x t, X 0
as a consequence of Assumption 5, Remark 2, and Lebesgue's dominated convergence theorem.
Uniform convergence: As in the proof of Theorem 4, see [11, Th. 8] , one can show that for all t 1 , t 2 
We fix an > 0 and consider a partition 0 = t 0 < t 1 < . . . < t j = T of [0, T ] such that for all t, t ∈ [t k , t k + 1 ], for N ≥ 1, x (N ) (t) −x (N ) (t ) < and x(t) −x(t ) < . By the pointwise convergence, there exists N 0 such that for all N > N 0 , for k = 1, . . . , j, x (N ) (t k ) −x(t k ) < . We fix N > N 0 . For an arbitrary t ∈ [0, T ], there exists k such that t ∈ [t k , t k + 1 ]. We have ] x (N ) (t) −x(t) 2 = 0. This implies (24) .
B. Proof of Theorem 6
Let u ∈ U N such that J so c u, x (N ) ≤ J so c û (N ) ,x (N ) . Noting (19) , the compactness of Θ, the continuity of Π θ j (t) with respect to t and θ and Assumption 5, one can prove that (1/N )J so c û (N ) ,x (N ) < c 0 , where c 0 is independent of N . Therefore, (1/N )J so c u, x (N ) <
For a fixed pointx of G, and recalling (13) we have 
where φ i is the final cost of agent i. If the final costs are convex (which is not the case here), then (31) implies (25). To handle the nonconvexity, steps (30) and (31) are replaced by (28), (29) and Assumption 2.
C. Proof of Theorem 7
First, the following two lemmas serve to approximate the asymptotic per agent cost. Noting that a a − b b = (a + b) (a − b) and that the minimum of l continuous functions is continuous, one can prove by the same techniques used in the proof of Lemma 5 that ψ 1 , ψ 2 , and ψ 3 converge to zero as N goes to infinity.
Proof of Theorem 7: Following Lemma 9, the per agent asymptotic optimal social cost is equal to J ∞ so c (x). Noting (20) , one can write 
